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The Limits of Statutory
Interpretation: Towards Explicit
Engagement, by the Supreme
Court of Canada, with the Charter
Right to Freedom of Expression in
the Context of Copyright
Graham Reynolds"
In its
post-2002 copyright jurisprudence,the Supreme Court of Canada has clarified that
the Copyright Act grants a significant degree of latitude to non-copyright owning parties to
express themselves using copyrighted works. This outcome is attributableneither to the SCC
having interpretedprovisions of the Copyright Act according to Charter values, nor to the
SCC having weighed provisions of the Copyright Act against the section 2(b) right to freedom
ofexpression. Rather,it has resultedfrom the SCC interpretingprovisions of the Copyright Act
through the lens of the purpose ofcopyright, as rearticulatedby the SCC.
The author argues that despite the positive outcomes for the expression interests of noncopyright owning parties that have thus far resulted from the SOC's post-2002 copyright
jurisprudence,relying on statutory interpretationas the sole mechanism through which to protect
freedom of expression fails to adequately protect this Charter right in the context of copyright.
In order to ensure that this right isadequatelyprotected, the SCC should, where appropriate,
explicitly engage with the Charter right to freedom of expression in the context of copyright.

* Assistant Professor, Peter A Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia,
BA (Manitoba), LLB (Dalhousie), BCL, MPhil, DPhil (Oxford). The author is grateful to
Justine Pila and Meghan Murtha, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for their valuable
comments on versions of this article. Any errors or omissions are solely the responsibility
of the author.
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Introduction
Since the coming into force of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms1 in 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada has engaged with the
Charterright to freedom of expression in a wide range of contexts.2 One
area in which the SCC has yet to explicitly engage with the Charter
1. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK),
1982, c 11 [Charter].
2. See e.g. Ramsden v Peterborough(City), [1993] 2 SCR 1084, 15 OR (3d) 548 (postering);
Montrdal (City) v 2952-1366 Quibec Inc, 2005 SCC 62, [2005] 3 SCR 141 [Montrdal (City)]
(using a loudspeaker at the entrance to a business and broadcasting noise onto a street); R
v Lucas, [1998] 1 SCR 439, 157 DLR (4th) 423 (defamatory libel); Rocket v Royal College
of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 SCR 232, 73 OR (2d) 128 (advertising for dentists'
services).
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right to freedom of expression, however, is copyright.3 For a number
of reasons, this lack of explicit engagement is noteworthy. First, the
rights granted under copyright legislation permit copyright owners, in
certain circumstances, to restrain or limit the expression of non-copyright
owning parties, raising the question of whether certain core provisions of
Canada's Copyright Act4 are consistent with the Charterright to freedom
of expression. Second, a number of lower Canadian courts have engaged
with the intersection of the Charterright to freedom of expression and
copyright.5 Third, leading courts in a number of jurisdictions cited by the
SCC in the context of both its copyright and its freedom of expression
jurisprudence-including the Supreme Court of the United States,
the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, and the European Court
of Human Rights-have engaged with the intersection of freedom of
expression and copyright.6

3. The only Supreme Court of Canada decision that addresses copyright issues in which the
words "copyright" and "freedom of expression" appear together is Rogers Communications
Inc v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 35, [2012]

2 SCR 283 [Rogers v SOCAN]. In this decision, Abella J (dissenting), in discussing the
correct standard of review to be taken to decisions of the Copyright Board, stated that
"[i]f
concurrent jurisdiction with the courts in interpreting and applying something as
legally transcendent as the Charter does not affect the deference to which tribunals are
entitled in interpreting their own mandate, surely it is hard to justify carving out copyright
law for unique judicial 'protection'." Ibid at para 73.
4. RSC 1985, c C-42.
5. See e.g. Compagnie Gjndrale des Etablissements Michelin Michelin & Cie v National
Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW

Canada), [1997] 2 FCR 306, 124 FTR 192 [Michelin cited to FCR]. For articles that
critique the approaches adopted by lower Canadian courts to the intersection of the
Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright, see Carys J Craig, "Putting
the Community in Communication: Dissolving the Conflict Between Freedom
of Expression and Copyright" (2006) 56:1 UTLJ 75 [Craig, "Dissolving Conflict"];
David Fewer, "Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits
of Copyright in Canada" (1997) 55:2 UT Fac L Rev 175; Ysolde Gendreau, "Canadian
Copyright Law and Its Charters" in Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen, eds, Copyright
and Free Speech (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 245.
6. See Golan v Holder (2012), 132 S Ct 873; Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd (2001),
[2002] EWCA Civ 1142 [Ashdown]; Laugh It Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries
International(Finance)BVt/aSabmark International,[2005] ZACC 7.
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Despite its lack of explicit engagement with the Charter right to
freedom of expression, the SCC, in its post-2002 copyright jurisprudence,
has clarified that the Copyright Act grants a significant degree of latitude
to non-copyright owning parties to express themselves using copyrighted
works. This outcome is attributable neither to the SCC having interpreted
provisions of the Copyright Act according to Chartervalues nor to the
SCC having weighed provisions of the Copyright Act against the section
2(b) right to freedom of expression. Rather, it has resulted from the
SCC interpreting provisions of the Copyright Act through the lens of the
purpose of copyright, as rearticulated by the SCC. Given this result, it
could be argued that any explicit engagement with freedom of expression
is unnecessary and that in the context of copyright, the Charterright to
freedom of expression is given adequate protection through the vehicle of
statutory interpretation.
In this article, I argue that there are limits to the use of statutory
interpretation as a mechanism through which to protect expression
interests and that relying on statutory interpretation as the sole
mechanism through which to protect freedom of expression in the context
of copyright fails to adequately protect the Charterright to freedom of
expression. Despite the positive outcomes for the expression interests
of non-copyright owning parties that have thus far resulted from the
SCC's post-2002 copyright jurisprudence, I argue that the SCC should,
where appropriate, explicitly engage with the Charterright to freedom of
expression in the context of copyright.
This article will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will describe how the
SCC, through the course of its post-2002 copyright jurisprudence, has
rearticulated the purpose of copyright from an author-centric approachunder which the sole objective of copyright is to protect and reward
copyright owners-to an approach under which the rewards granted
to copyright owners can and ought to be limited by public interest
considerations (including the public's interest in accessing, disseminating
and using expression).
7. For greater clarity, I am not arguing that direct engagement with the Charterwould
have resulted in different outcomes in any of the SCC's post-2002 copyright decisions.
Rather, I am arguing that, in certain circumstances, it may be necessary to engage directly
with the Charterin order to ensure that freedom of expression is adequately protected in
the context of copyright.
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In Part II, using the fair dealing provisions of the CopyrightAct as my
case study,' I will demonstrate both how the SCC has interpreted the
fair dealing provisions of the Copyright Act in light of this purpose, and
how these interpretations have resulted in a significant degree of space
being preserved within which non-copyright owning parties may express
themselves using copyrighted works.
In Part III, I will explore the question of why the SCC has yet to
explicitly engage with the relationship between freedom of expression (a
Charter-protectedright and a Chartervalue) and copyright. I will offer
three explanations.' First, I will argue that, in a manner consistent with
the governing approach to copyright in Canada, a primary focus of the
SCC's post-2002 copyright jurisprudence has been to ensure that copyright
owners are not overcompensated at the expense of the public interestone element of which is the public interest in accessing, disseminating
8. In contrast with the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression and
copyright, fair dealing is a topic that has received a significant amount of scrutiny from
scholars. See e.g. Daniel J Gervais, "Canadian Copyright Law Post-CCH" (2004) 18 IPJ
131; Ariel Katz, "Fair Use 2.0: The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada" in Michael Geist,
ed, The Copyright Pentalogy: How the Supreme Court of Canada Shook the Foundations of
Canadian CopyrightLaw (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013) 93 [Geist, Copyright
Pentalogy]; Myra J Tawfik, "International Copyright Law: W[h]ither User Rights?"
in Michael Geist, ed, In the Public Interest (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2005) 66 [Geist, Public
Interest]; Myra J Tawfik, "The Supreme Court of Canada and the 'Fair Dealing Trilogy':
Elaborating a Doctrine of User Rights Under Canadian Copyright Law" (2013) 51:1 Alta
L Rev 191 [Tawfik, "Fair Dealing"]; Gluseppina D'Agostino, "Healing Fair Dealing?: A
Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada's Fair Dealing to UK Fair Dealing and US
Fair Use" (2009) 53:2 McGill Lj 309; Carys Craig, "The Changing Face of Fair Dealing
in Canadian Copyright Law: A Proposal for Legislative Reform" in Geist, PublicInterest,
supra [Craig, "Fair Dealing"]; Abraham Drassinower, "Taking User Rights Seriously" in
Geist, Public Interest, supra, 462; Meera Nair, "Fair Dealing at a Crossroads" in Michael
Geist, ed, From "RadicalExtremism" to "Balanced Copyright" Canadian Copyrightand the
DigitalAgenda (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) 90; Samuel E Trosow, "Fair Dealing Practices
in the Post-Secondary Education Sector after the Pentalogy" in Geist, Copyright Pentalogy,
supra, 213; Rosemary J Coombe, Darren Wershler & Martin Zeilinger, eds, Dynamic Fair
Dealing: Creating Canadian Culture Online (oronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).
9. As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, a fourth explanation could also be offered.
Specifically, it could be the case that lawyers, when litigating copyright cases in Canada,
have not raised Charter issues before the court of first instance. Thus, the absence
of explicit consideration by the SCC of the Charterright to freedom of expression, in
the context of copyright, could be explained (at least in part) by the SCC's reluctance
to raise constitutional questions that have not been raised by litigants in courts below
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and using works of expression. Interpreted through the lens of this
approach, fair dealing and other users' rights have been conceptualized as
mechanisms that limit copyright owners' rights, or as tools that mediate
between "protection and access", as opposed to defences, the purpose of
which is to protect or promote freedom of expression." Conceptualized
in this manner, it has not been strictly necessary for the SCC to engage
with the intersection of the Charterright to freedom of expression and
copyright.
Second, I argue that the absence of explicit engagement in the SCC's
post-2002 copyright jurisprudence with the Charterright to freedom of
expression can also be attributed, at least in part, to the SCC's conclusion
that statutory provisions may only be interpreted in accordance with
Chartervalues (such as freedom of expression) in limited circumstances."1
This conclusion restricts the extent to which courts-including the SCCcan interpret provisions of the Copyright Act according to Chartervalues.
Third, I suggest that the SCC's lack of explicit engagement with the
Charterright to freedom of expression in the context of copyright could
also be interpreted as the SCC accepting that, provided the provisions of
the Copyright Act are correctly interpreted, freedom of expression is either
fully or adequately protected by mechanisms internal to the Copyright
Act. It would therefore be unnecessary for the Court to provide additional
protection for freedom of expression interests by explicitly engaging with
the Charterright to freedom of expression.
The questions of whether, how often and in what contexts litigants and lawyers in copyright
cases raise Charterissues is an interesting and important one, and one that I am exploring
in a different article. But see CCH CanadianLtd v Law Society of Upper Canada,2002 FCA
187 at paras 170-71, [2002] 4 FCR 213 (for a copyright decision where constitutional and
Chartervalues were raised by a party to the litigation (the Law Society) and were referenced
in the majority judgment) [CCHFCA]. The SCC's subsequent decision, however, made no
reference to the Charter,despite drawing on other aspects of the Federal Court of Appeal's
majority judgment. See CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13,
[2004] 1 SCR 339 [CCHSCC]. Given that there is at least this one instance in which the
Charterwas raised in an appellate-level copyright decision but not mentioned by the SCC
in that same decision, it is important to critically analyse the question of why the SCC has
thus far not engaged with the Charterin its post-2002 copyright jurisprudence.
10. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishersof Canada v Bell Canada,2012 SCC
36 at para 11, [2012] 2 SCR 326 [SOCANv Bell].
11. See Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnershipv R, 2002 SCC 42 at paras 28-30, [2002] 2 SCR
559 [Bell Express Vu].
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The explanations offered above may account-at least in part-for
the absence of explicit engagement by the SCC with the Charterright
to freedom of expression in the context of its post-2002 copyright
jurisprudence. However, they do not justify continued non-engagement
with the Charter right to freedom of expression by the SCC in all
contexts relating to copyright. In Part IV, I argue that relying exclusively
on statutory interpretation fails to adequately protect the Charterright
to freedom of expression in the context of copyright, and that the SCC
should, where appropriate, explicitly engage with this right.
I will conclude by outlining three ways in which Canadian courts can
explicitly engage with the intersection of the Charter right to freedom
of expression and copyright, namely: by re-conceptualizing the fair
dealing defence (along with other defences) as a stand-alone "freedom of
expression" defence; by interpreting certain provisions of the Copyright
Act according to Chartervalues and by considering whether certain core
provisions of the CopyrightAct unjustifiably infringe the Charterright to
freedom of expression.

I. The SCC's Rearticulation of the Purpose of
Copyright
In 2002, in his reasons for judgment in Thiberge v Galeried'artdu Petit
ChamplainInc,12 Binnie J departed from the view accepted by the SCC in
Bishop v Stevens 3 that copyright is singularly directed towards benefiting
or rewarding authors (an approach referred to by Abella J as the authorcentric approach to copyright) 4 . Instead, Binnie J stated that
[t]he CopyrightAct is usually presented as a balance between promoting the public interest
in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a
just reward for the creator (or, more accurately, to prevent someone other than the creator

from appropriating whatever benefits may be generated). 5
12. 2002 SCC 34 at para 30, [2002] 2 SCR 336, Binnie, Iacobucci, Major JJ and McLachlin
CJC, concurring [Thiberge].

13. [1990] 2 SCR 467, 72 DLR (4th) 97.
14. SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 9.

15. Thiberge,supra note 12 (Binnie J acknowledged that his articulation of the purpose or
objective of copyright "is not new" at para 30). See also Robertson v Thomson Corp, 15 CPR
(4th) 147 at para 23, 2001 CanLII 28353 (Ont Sup Ct J); Apple Computer Inc vMackintosh
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Justice Binnie's rearticulation of the purpose of copyright-invoking
a public interest that can limit or act in opposition to the rights of
the copyright owner-showcases his concern that a copyright system
focused exclusively on protecting the rights of copyright owners might
overcompensate copyright owners at the expense of the public interest.16
Justice Binnie's description of the Copyright Act as balancing between
rewarding creators and the public interest and his statement that "due
weight" must be given to the "limited nature" of creator's rights reinforce
this view.1
In Thiberge, Bminie J's concern with ensuring that copyright owners
are not overcompensated at the expense of the public interest is rooted in
part in his concern about the impact of a successful copyright infringement
lawsuit on a defendants' ability to use their personal property (their
lawfully purchased Theberge prints)." However, although Bminie
J's reasons for judgment focused on the proper balance between the
copyright holder's rights and the "proprietary interest of the purchasing
public",19 the manner in which Binnie J articulated the public interest
engaged by copyright-as the "public interest in the encouragement and
disseminationof works of the artsand intellect"2 -suggests concern not just
for the impact of copyright on a third party's personal property, but also
for the impact of copyright on expression interests.21

Computers Ltd (1986), [1987] 1 FCR 173, 44 DIR (4th) 74; Sayre v Moore (1785), 102 ER
139 (KB) Mansfield L:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that
men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community,
may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and
labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts be retarded.
Ibid at 139.
16. Thiberge,supra note 12 at para 31.
17. Ibid.

18. See ibid at paras 1-2.
19. Ibid at para 29.

20. Ibid at para 30 [emphasis added].
21. See The Honourable Ian Binnie, "Three Years Later: Making Sense of the Changes
in Canadian Copyright" (Lecture delivered at the Copyright in Canada Conference, 2
October 2015), online: < mediacast.ic.utoronto.ca/20151002-CopyCon2015/index.htm# >
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The argument that Binnie J's rearticulation of the purpose of copyright
suggests concern for the impact of the enforcement of copyright on the
expression interests of non-copyright owning parties is reinforced by
the way in which Binnie J connected "excessive control" by copyright
holders to possible negative consequences for the public domain. 2 As
Binnie J noted:
Excessive control by holders of copyrights and other forms of intellectual property
may unduly limit the ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative
innovation in the long-term interests of society as a whole, or create practical obstacles to
proper utilization."

Thus, while Binnie

J

noted that Thiberge "demonstrates the basic

economic conflict between the holder of the intellectual property
in a work and the owner of the tangible property that embodies the
copyrighted expression", his rearticulation of the purpose of copyright
also arguably acknowledges the "basic . . . conflict between the holder

of the intellectual property in a work" and those who wish to engage in
expression in ways that "[embody] the copyrighted expression".24
Additionally, while Binnie J emphasized the need to ensure that
copyright owners are not given "excessive control" over tangible
embodiments of their works, or are not "overcompensated" at the
expense of a third party's property rights, the way in which the balance
is framed in Th'berge also leads to the conclusion that copyright owners
should be given neither "excessive control" over expression embodying
their copyrighted works nor be "overcompensated" at the expense of
the public's expression interests.25 Though it would be "self-defeating to
undercompensate" copyright owners, their rights are limited-and can
He indicated that one "ought not to read copyright cases in isolation"; that a major theme
of the SCC's jurisprudence over the past several decades has been an "aggressive promotion
of free speech"; and that "the notion of the commons, ... the ability of everybody to access
everything in the interests of free expression and the advancement of knowledge, is a theme
of the court that goes well beyond copyright law". Ibid. These statements suggest that the
SCC may have had freedom of expression in mind when crafting its post-2002 copyright
jurisprudence.
22. Thberge,supra note 12 at para 32.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid at para 33.
25. Ibid at paras 31-32.
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be limited as per Thiberge-in order to preserve the balance between
guaranteeing a just or fair reward to copyright owners and promoting the
public interest in the creation and dissemination of expression.2 6
Subsequent to Thiberge, a number of copyright cases decided by the
SCC framed the "public interest" specifically as the public's interest in
accessing expression." For instance, in CCH CanadianLtd v Law Society
of Upper Canada (CCHSCC), the public interest is framed as the ability

of non-copyright owning parties to access, use and disseminate specific
types of works of expression-namely legal resources." As noted by
McLachlin CJC, quoting Linden JA's Federal Court of Appeal decision
in CCH CanadianLtd v Law Society of Upper Canada (CCH FCA): "It is

generally in the public interest that access to judicial decisions and other
legal resources not be unjustifiably restrained."29
In a similar manner to CCH SCC, the public interest referred to
by Abella j in her dissenting judgment in Robertson v Thomson Corp
(McLachlin CJC and Charron J concurring) is the public interest in
ensuring continued access to a specific type of work of expression-namely
archived newspapers, which Abella J describes as "a primary resource for
teachers, students, writers, reporters, and researchers"."
In SOCAN v CAIP, a decision that addresses the question of whether
and to what extent tariffs could be imposed on Canadian internet service
providers, Binnie J emphasized the "vital" importance of the "continued
expansion and development [of internet intermediaries] ... to national
economic growth". 1 However, Binnie J's articulation of the public
interest in SOCAN v CAIP, and of the balance between the public interest
and the rights of the copyright owner, can also be read in context with
his statement earlier in his reasons that "[tihe capacity of the Internet to
disseminate 'works of the arts and intellect' is one of the great innovations
26. Ibid at para 31.
27. See Teresa Scassa, "Interests in the Balance" in Geist, PublicInterest, supra note 8, 41
(for an article that discusses the various conceptions of the public interest at play in
Canadian copyright jurisprudence).
28. Supra note 9.
29. Ibid at para 71, citing CCHFCA, supra note 9 at para 159.
30. 2006 SCC 43 at para 70, [2006] 2 SCR 363.
31. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn of

Internet Providers,2004 SCC 45 at para 131, [2004] 2 SCR 427 [SOCANv CAIP].
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of the information age." 32 Thus, at least one element of the public interest
referred to in SOCAN v CAIP can be seen as the public interest in
facilitating the fair dissemination of expression on the internet.33
The idea that the public interest against which the reward to
copyright owners must be balanced encompasses the encouragement
and dissemination of expression is reinforced in SOCAN v Bell.3 In this
decision, SOCAN submitted to the SCC that "only uses that contribute
to the creative process are in the public interest". 5 Justice Abella, who
wrote the reasons for judgment for the Court in SOCAN v Bell, rejected
this argument, stating that "the dissemination of works is also one of the
Act's purposes, which means that dissemination too, with or without
creativity, is in the public interest". 6 Given that the purpose of copyright
involves balancing the rights of copyright owners with the public interest,
under this view of the public interest, although copyright owners must
not be "undercompensate[d]", the scope of their "just reward[s]" can be
determined in such a manner as to facilitate the dissemination, as well as
37
the creation, of expression.
In Cinar Corp v Robinson,3 the SCC further refined the purpose
of copyright in Canada. Specifically, McLachlin CJC clarified, for the
first time in a Canadian copyright decision, the relationship between
copyright's two objectives: rewarding authors and incentivizing the
creation of new expression. Writing for the Court, McLachlin CJC stated
that copyright "seeks to ensure that an author will reap the benefits of his
efforts, in order to incentivize the creation of new works". 39 The exclusive,
limited economic rights provided by copyright are thus presented by the
SCC as mechanisms that encourage the production and dissemination of
works of the arts and intellect.
As demonstrated above, through the course of its post-2002 copyright
jurisprudence, the SCC has rearticulated the purpose of copyright.
Rejecting the former approach to copyright, under which the sole
32. Ibid at para 40.
33. Ibid.
34. Supra note 10.
35. Ibid at para 20.

36. Ibid at para 21.
37. Thiberge,supra note 12 at paras 30-31.

38. 2013 SCC 73, [2013] 3 SCR 1168.
39. Ibid at para 23 [emphasis added].
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objective of copyright is to protect and reward copyright owners, the
SCC has instead articulated a conception of copyright as a mechanism
through which to encourage the creation and dissemination of expression.40
However, although the promise of limited economic rights can
incentivize the creation and dissemination of expression, the exercise
of those same rights can limit both the creation of new expression and
the dissemination of existing expression. Given the potential impact of
the enforcement of copyright on expression, in order for copyright to
fulfill its purpose, care must be taken to ensure that the rewards provided
by copyright for the creation of expression do not "overcompensate"
copyright owners by unnecessarily impeding the further creation or
dissemination of expression.41
A. Statutory Interpretationand the Purpose of Copyright
The SCC's rearticulation of the purpose of copyright is a critically
important piece of its post-2002 copyright jurisprudence. This is due to
the important role played by the purpose of legislation in the context of
the prevailing approach to statutory interpretation in Canada, namely the
"modern approach of purposive interpretation" (the modern approach).
Under the modern approach (drawn from Professor Elmer Driedger's
text Constructionof Statutes): "[tihe words of an Act are to be read in their
entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously
40. Several commentators have described the purpose of copyright in Canada in a similar
manner. See e.g. Daniel J Gervais, "The Purpose of Copyright Law in Canada" (2005) 2:2
U Ottawa L & Technology J 315 (describing the "economic purpose of copyright law [as]
instrumentalist in nature, namely, to ensure the orderly production and distribution of,
and access to, works of art and intellect" at 317) [Gervais, "Copyright Law"]. See also Craig,
"Dissolving Conflict", supra note 5 (in which Craig argues that in Canada, "copyright can
be regarded as a policy tool whose purpose is to advance our common interest in the
vibrant social exchange of meaning; rights for authors provide an incentive (economic,
but perhaps also personal) for useful and necessary creation" at 109-10). Cf Abraham
Drassinower, Whrat's Wrong With Copying? (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press,
2015) (in which Drassinower provides a "rights-based account of copyright law" focused on
works of authorship as communicative acts at 2-8).
41. Tfhberge, supra note 12 at para 31. See also Gervais, "Copyright Law", supra note 40
("[c]opyright is not there to 'protect' authors (or other owners of copyright), but rather to
maximize the creation, production and dissemination of knowledge and access thereto. In
other words, protection is not an end but a means to achieving that purpose, which implies
that the level of protection must be properly calibrated" at 324).
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within the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention
of Parliament".4" Stephane Beaulac and Pierre-Andre Cot6 write that
"Driedger's words [have been described by Canadian courts as] a 'definitive
formulation' which 'best captures or encapsulates' the approach, even the
'starting point' for statutory interpretation in Canada".43
In CCH SCC, McLachlin CJC clarified that Courts should apply
the modern approach when tasked with "interpreting the scope of the
CopyrightAct's rights and remedies"." 4Including McLachlin CJC's reasons
for judgment in CCH SCC,45 Driedger's modern approach to statutory
interpretation has been cited in seven of the fifteen copyright decisions
handed down by the SCC between 2002 and 2015.46

II. Interpreting the Copyright Act in Light of
the Purpose Outlined Above: The User Right of
Fair Dealing
Both the SCC's decisions to refer to defences and exceptions to
copyright infringement as user rights and its application of the concept
of user rights in the context of fair dealing exemplify the way in which
the SCC has used statutory interpretation to prevent overcompensation
of copyright owners at the expense of the public interest, in a manner
consistent with the purpose of copyright as rearticulated by the SCC in
42. Elmer Driedger, Constructionof Statutes, 2nd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) at 87.
43. St6phane Beaulac & Pierre-Andr6 C6t6, "Driedger's 'Modern Principle' at the Supreme
Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization" (2006) 40:1 RJT 131 at 139.
44. Supra note 9 at para 9.
45. Ibid.
46. See also Euro-Excellence Inc v Krat Canada Inc, 2007 SCC 37 at paras 2, 74,
[2007] 3 SCR 20; Entertainment Software Association v Society of Composers, Authors
and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 SCC 34 at para 71, [2012] 2 SCR 231; Re:Sound
v Motion Picture Theatre Association of Canada, 2012 SCC 38 at para 32, [2012] 2 SCR
376; Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order
CRTC 2010-168, 2012 SCC 68 at paras 11-12, [2012] 3 SCR 489; CanadianBroadcasting

Corp v SONDRAC 2003 Inc, 2015 SCC 57 at para 48, 392 DLR (4th) 1 [SONDRAC].
For an indirect reference, see Thberge, supra note 12 at para 113, Gonthier J, dissenting
(in this paragraph, Gonthier J both referenced the substance of Driedger's test as well as a
paragraph of the SCC judgement in Rizzo &Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para
21, 154 DLR (4th) 193 in which Driedger's modern approach is directly cited).
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its post-2002 copyright jurisprudence. As I will describe, one consequence
of the SCC's use of purposive interpretation in these contexts is the
preservation of a significant degree of space within which non-copyright
owning parties may express themselves using copyrighted works.
A. Guarding Against Overcompensating Copyright Owners Through the
Characterizationof Defences andLimitations to Copyright Infringement as

User Rights
The first reference to the phrase "user rights" in Canadian copyright
jurisprudence is found in Linden JA's reasons for judgment in the 2002
FCA decision in CCH FCA.4 Justice Linden used this term when
discussing Gibson J's determination in CCH CanadianLtd v Law Society
of Upper Canada that exceptions to copyright infringement should be
"strictly construed"."8 Justice Linden responded to this statement by

indicating
[t]here is no basis in law or in policy for such an approach. An overly restrictive
interpretation of the exemptions contained in the Act would be inconsistent with the
mandate of copyright law to harmonize owners' rights with legitimate public interests.
Instead, courts should employ the usual modern rules of purposive construction in the
context. As Professor Vaver has pointed out, "User rights are not just loopholes. Both
owner rights and user rights should therefore be given [a] fair and balanced reading.""

The characterization of defences as user rights is thus presented by
Linden JA as being linked to the rearticulation, by Binnie J in Theberge,
of the purpose of copyright. If the purpose of copyright is both to ensure
that copyright owners are justly or fairly rewarded, and to encourage
the public interest in the creation and dissemination of expression-and
if these purposes can at times exist in tension with one another-then,
in order to give effect to the purpose of copyright and to guard against

overcompensating copyright owners, defences to copyright infringement
47. Supra note 9. See also Katz, supra note 8 (describing how "even before the Supreme
Court of Canada declared in CCH that fair dealing is a 'users' right', courts and
commentators often referred to the ability to use another's work without permission as a
users' right, and employed the term 'the right of fair user'" at 102).
48. CCHFCA, supra note 9 at para 126, citing CCHCanadianLtdvLaw Society of Upper
Canada (1999), [2000] 2 FCR 451 at para 175, 169 FTR 1.
49. CCHFCA, supra note 9 at para 126 [citations omitted].
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must not be given an "overly restrictive interpretation"." The parallel
structure of the terms "users' rights" and "owners' rights" reflects the
balancing process that-post-Th'berge-must be applied by courts in
evaluating copyright infringement claims.
CCHSCCwas the first SCC decision in which the term "user right" was
used in reference to defences and exceptions to copyright infringement. 1
In her judgment for the Court, McLachlin CJC's description of user
rights evokes Binnie J's rearticulation of copyright as a system of laws
that attempts to balance between copyright owners' rights and the
public interest. Chief Justice McLachlin described "fair dealing ... like
other exceptions in the Copyright Act, [as] ...a user's right", and she
wrote that "[uln order to maintain the proper balance between the rights
of a copyright owner and users' interests, it must not be interpreted
restrictively."52 In SOCAN v Bell, Abella J, writing for the Court, also
linked user rights to the purpose of copyright as articulated in Theberge,
indicating that they "are an essential part of furthering the public interest
objectives of the Copyright Act".53
One common element of both Linden JA's reasons for judgment in
CCH FCA and McLachlin CJC's reasons for judgment in CCH SCC is
that both judgments cite David Vaver's work in the area of user rights."s
Vaver has engaged with the topic of user rights both in his intellectual
property textbook and in his copyright law text. In Copyright Law,
Vaver devotes an entire chapter to the topic of user rights (a chapter
that might otherwise have been referred to as defences against copyright
infringement, or exceptions and limitations to copyright infringement). 5
Vaver uses the term "user rights" in place of these other terms, stating
that "[a]ny use that falls under a statutory exception does not infringe
copyright, and so may fairly be called a 'user right'". 6
50. Ibid.
51. Supra note 9. Tawfik, "Fair Dealing", supra note 8 (describing CCH as "a watershed
moment in Canadian copyright law" at 195).
52. CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 48.
53. Supra note 10 at para 11.
54. CCH FCA, supra note 9 at para 59, citing David Vaver, Copyright Law (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2000) at 169-71 [Vaver, Copyright Law]; CCH SCC, supra note 9 at para 48,
citing Vaver, supra at 171.
55. Vaver, CopyrightLaw, supra note 54 at 169.

56. Ibid at 170.
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In a manner similar to American scholars L. Ray Patterson and
Stanley Lindberg's use of the term user rights, Vaver's use of this term
is connected to his rejection of an approach to copyright through which
owners' rights are interpreted broadly and exceptions to copyright
infringement are interpreted narrowly.5 Exemplified in Michelin," Vaver
describes this approach as
bad law and bad policy. It runs counter to decisions such as the Supreme Court's reversal
of a trial judgment that equated a user benefit with the "taking" of copyright property.
Moreover, the policy of copyright law has always been to balance competing owner and
user interests according to both contemporary exigencies and transcendental imperatives
such as free speech and free trade.59

Vaver's use of the term user rights can thus be seen as a conscious push
back against the Michelin approach, which was, at the time he published
the book noted above, the dominant approach in Canadian copyright law.
Instead, Vaver advocates for an approach to copyright in which owner
rights are limited and are balanced with public interest considerations
such as freedom of expression." Such an approach, as described in the
previous section, was adopted by Binnie J in Thiberge.61

57. David Vaver, "Copyright Defences as User Rights" (2013) 60:4 J Copyright Society
USA 661 (where Vaver also explicitly references the Patterson and Lindberg text, noting
that this work "conceptualize[s] American copyright law and its interrelation with First
Amendment principles as a balance between authors, publishers, and users" at 667) [Vaver,
"Copyright Defences"]. Vaver in fact suggests further reading L Ray Patterson and Stanley
W Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users' Rights (Athens, Ga: University of
Georgia Press, 1991), in Vaver, Copyright Law, supra note 54 at 227.
58. Supra note 5.
59. Vaver, CopyrightLaw, supra note 54 at 171 [footnotes omitted].
60. Teresa Scassa writes that in "characteriz[ing] statutory exceptions to infringement
as 'users' rights', [the SCC] plac[es] them on a par with the rights of copyright owners,
in terms of achieving the purposes of the legislation". Teresa Scassa, "Acknowledging
Copyright's Illegitimate Offspring: User-Generated Content and Canadian Copyright
Law" in Geist, CopyrightPentalogy, supra note 8, 431 at 435 [footnotes omitted].
61. A comparison between Professor Vaver's articulation of the policy of copyright
and Binnie J's articulation of the purpose of copyright in Thiberge is informative. Both
articulations focus on a "balance" between owner interests and other interests (Professor
Vaver focuses on "user" interests while Binnie J focused on the "public interest";
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B. Guarding Against Overcompensating Copyright Owners Through the
SCC's Articulation of FairDealing
(i) The Scope of Fair Dealing is Informed by the Purpose of Copyright
Fair dealing is the broadest defence to copyright infringement in
Canada. Set out in sections 29-29.2 of the Copyright Act, under fair
dealing persons may use a substantial part of copyrighted works for the
purposes of research, private study, education, parody, satire, criticism,
review or news reporting, provided the dealing is fair and, in the cases of
criticism, review and news reporting, certain attribution requirements are
satisfied.62 As articulated in CCH SCC, the fair dealing analysis proceeds
in two steps. First, defendants must establish that their dealing is for
one of the purposes set out in the Copyright Act.63 Second, the defendant
must establish that their dealing is fair.64 As noted by Abella J in Alberta
(Education) v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright),
"[t]he onus is on the person invoking 'fair dealing' to satisfy all aspects of
the test".65 Any act that is considered fair dealing is non-infringing.
During the period in which the author-centric approach was the
governing approach to copyright in Canada, defences to copyright
infringement such as fair dealing were interpreted in a narrow,
restrictive manner.66 In its post-2002 copyright jurisprudence,
however, the SCC has rejected this interpretation of the scope of
fair dealing. As noted above, both Linden JA in CCH FCA and
McLachlin CJC in the SCC's decision in CCH SCC characterized fair
dealing as a user's right which is not to be interpreted restrictively.6

Professor Vaver focuses on "owner" interests while Binnie J focused on "the creator"); and
both articulations accept that these two interests can be in competition. One difference is
that while Professor Vaver cites "free speech" as an element of the balancing process, Binnie
J balances a just reward to the creator with "the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect". Thiberge, supra note 12 at para 30.
62. CopyrightAct, supra note 4, ss 29-29.2.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 50.
Ibid.
2012 SCC 37 at para 12, [2012] 2 SCR 345 [Alberta (Education)].
See e.g. Michelin, supra note 5 at paras 63, 65.
CCHFCA, supra note 9 at para 126; CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 48.
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As well, in CCH SCC, McLachlin CJC stated that fair dealing is "an
integral part of the scheme of copyright".6"
In CCH SCC, McLachlin CJC clarified that "the purpose of the fair
dealing exception ... is to ensure that users are not unduly restricted in
their ability to use and disseminate copyrighted works".69 In SOCAN v
Bell, Abella J built on this characterization of fair dealing by describing
it as "[o]ne of the tools employed to achieve the proper balance between
protection and access in the Act"." Fair dealing is thus portrayed both by
McLachlin CJC in CCHSCC and, eight years later, by Abella J in SOCAN
v Bell as a mechanism mediating between the reward granted to copyright
owners and the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination
of expression-as a tool that limits the rights of copyright owners and, in
so doing, facilitates access to works of expression. The application of fair
dealing by the SCC ensures-in a manner consistent with the purpose
of copyright as rearticulated by the SCC-that the incentive provided
by copyright for the creation of expression does not "overcompensate"
copyright owners by unnecessarily impeding the further creation, or the
dissemination, of expression.
(ii) Fair Dealing has Been Interpreted in a Manner that Guards Against
Overprotecting Copyright Owners
Through the course of its post-2002 copyright jurisprudence, the
SCC's interpretations of the fair dealing provisions of the CopyrightActinformed by the purpose of copyright as outlined above-have confirmed
that the space within which non-copyright owning parties may exercise
their expression interests is more expansive than many had previously
believed. In this section, I will discuss several ways through which the
SCC has interpreted the fair dealing provisions in such a manner, namely
68. Ibid at paras 48-49. In describing fair dealing as an integral part of copyright,
McLachlin CJC's reasons for judgment echo comments made by Leval J. Describing
the American analogous defence of fair use, Leval J writes that: "[flair use should be
perceived not as a disorderly basket of exceptions to the rules of copyright, nor as a
departure from the principles governing that body of law, but rather as a rational, integral
part of copyright, whose observance is necessary to achieve the objectives of that law".
Pierre N Leval, "Toward a Fair Use Standard" (1990) 103:5 Harv L Rev 1105 at 1107.
69. Supra note 9 at para 63.
70. Supra note 10 at para 11.
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by interpreting fair dealing categories broadly and by its articulation of
the fairness analysis.1
a. Fair Dealing Categories Interpreted Broadly
In CCH SCC, McLachlin CJC indicated that "in order to ensure that
users' rights are not unduly constrained", the categories of fair dealing
(such as research, the category in question in CCHSCC) "must be given
a large and liberal interpretation".2 McLachlin CJC's judgment in CCH
SCC was the first Canadian copyright decision to use the phrase "large and
liberal"." Neither the phrase "large and liberal" nor the use of the word
"integral" in reference to the importance of fair dealing to the Copyright
Act as a whole were used by Linden JA in his reasons for judgment in
CCHFCA. 7
Justice Abella confirmed that, as a result of the "large and liberal"
interpretation to be given to categories of fair dealing post-CCH SCC,
the first step of the fair dealing analysis has a "relatively low threshold"."
This conceptualization of fair dealing evokes the governing approach to
the Charterright to freedom of expression adopted by the SCC-where
the section 2(b) analysis can be seen as having a "relatively low threshold"
and with the "analytical heavy-hitting" being done in the context of the
section 1 analysis.6
According to Abella J, the fairness analysis is where "the analytical
heavy-hitting is done in determining whether the dealing is fair"." The low
threshold for fair dealing categories means that many uses of works will

71. Other ways through which the SCC has interpreted fair dealing provisions in such
a manner as to limit the scope of protection granted to copyright owners, resulting in
expansions in the space available for non-copyright owning parties, are by determining that
parties may rely on their general practices to establish fair dealing and by determining that
dealings should be analyzed from the perspective of the ultimate user.
72. Supra note 9 at para 51 [emphasis added].
73. Ibid.
74. Supra note 9.
75. SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 27.
76. Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 986-1000, 58 DLR

(4th) 577.
77. SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 27.
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pass the first stage of the fair dealing analysis. 78 Geist argues that following
the copyright pentalogy, "[tihe core of fair dealing is fairness-fairness to
the copyright owner in setting limits on the use of their work without
permission and fairness to users to ensure that fair dealing rights can be
exercised without unnecessarily restrictive limitations"." Maintaining a
low threshold for fair dealing categories avoids overprotecting copyright
owners at the expense of the public interest, in that it reduces the potential
for uses that would otherwise be found to be fair to fail the fair dealing
analysis on the basis of the first step.
The SCC has interpreted two fair dealing categories in its post-2002
copyright jurisprudence: research and private study. The SCC has
commented on the scope of the "research" category in three decisions:
CCH SCC, SOCAN v Bell and Alberta (Education).0 One question raised
in CCH SCC was whether the fair dealing category of research should
be restricted to non-commercial contexts."1 In some jurisdictions, the
commercial nature of a dealing results in its exclusion from fair dealing
protection."2 As Barton Beebe writes: "many... have been highly critical,
even dismissive, of the commerciality inquiry, primarily on the ground
that nearly all expression in our culture is produced for profit or is
78. The 2012 amendments to the Copyright Act, in which three additional fair dealing
categories were added to section 29, further expand the range of works that will pass the
first stage of the fairness analysis. Michael Geist argues that "the breadth of the fair dealing
analyses are likely to involve only a perfunctory assessment of the first-stage purposes test
together with a far more rigorous analysis ... in the second-stage, six-factor assessment".
Michael Geist, "Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair
Use" in Geist, Copyright Pentalogy, supra note 8, 157 at 159 [Geist, "Fairness Found"].
Elsewhere, Katz also challenges the view that Parliament's codification of fair dealing was
intended to restrict its application to the enumerated purposes set out in the Copyright
Act, and writes that "the [SCC's] rulings and Parliament's action [in recognizing additional
purposes] have .. .provided a necessary correction that allows fair dealing to resume the
role it was always supposed to play". Katz, supra note 8 at 140.
79. Geist, "Fairness Found", supra note 78 at 181.
80. CCH SCC, supra note 9; SOCAN v Bell, supra note 10; Alberta (Education), supra

note 65.
81. Supra note 9 at para 51.
82. See e.g. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), c 48 (which provides that

"[f]air dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work for the purposes of research
for a non-commercial purpose does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that
it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement", s 29(1)).
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otherwise income-producing in some sense". 3 Excluding commercial uses
of works from fair dealing would thus be inconsistent with the purpose
of fair dealing, as articulated by the SCC, namely "to ensure that users are
not unduly restricted in their ability to use and disseminate copyrighted
works". 4 It would also overcompensate copyright owners in a manner
inconsistent with the purpose of copyright as rearticulated by the SCC
by excluding uses from fair dealing consideration that might otherwise be
considered fair.
In CCH SCC, McLachlin CJC rejected the argument that the fair
dealing category of research should be restricted to non-commercial
contexts. 5 In concluding that "lawyers carrying on the business of law
for profit are conducting research within the meaning of s. 29 of the
Copyright Act", 86 and, more generally, that commercial uses of works are
not excluded from fair dealing protection, the SCC has interpreted the
scope of fair dealing in such a manner as to preserve a significant degree
of space within which non-copyright owning parties may exercise their
expression interests.
The SCC, in CCH SCC, also considered and rejected the argument
that the fair dealing category of research should be limited to private
contexts. Like its determination that fair dealing should not be limited
to non-commercial contexts, the SCC's determination that fair dealing
should not be limited to private contexts is significant from the perspective
of the scope of the expression interests of non-copyright owning parties.
Determining that non-private dealings may still be fair dealings clarifies
that the scope of uses of works potentially protectable under fair dealing
includes those involving multiple researchers or a research community,
among other uses.
The SCC further clarified the scope of the category of research in
SOCAN v Bell. SOCAN had argued that the category of research should
be limited to creative purposes. Justice Abella rejected this argument,
stating that research "can be piecemeal, informal, exploratory, or
confirmatory", and that "[]t can.., be undertaken for no purpose except
83. Barton Beebe, "An Empirical Study of US Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005"
(2008) 156:3 U Pa L Rev 549 at 598. See also Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, 510 US 569 at

583-84 (1994); Authors Guild,Inc v Google, Inc, 804 F (3d) 202 at 218-19 (2nd Cir 2015).
84. CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 63.

85. Ibid at para5l.
86. Ibid.
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personal interest"." A narrow interpretation of a fair dealing category
was thus again rejected in favour of one that is more expansive.
As noted above, the second fair dealing category interpreted by
the SCC in its post-2002 copyright jurisprudence is private study. In a
manner similar to its interpretation of the research category, the SCC
has interpreted the "private study" category in a large and liberal manner.
In Alberta (Education),Abella J, who delivered the reasons for judgment of
the majority, wrote that "the word 'private' in 'private study' should not
be understood as requiring users to view copyrighted works in splendid
isolation. Studying and learning are essentially personal endeavours,
whether they are engaged in with others or in solitude.""8 By adopting an
interpretation of private study that accepts that individuals may engage
in private study with others, the SCC has ensured that uses that might
otherwise be fair are not excluded from the ambit of fair dealing on the
basis of a more restrictive interpretation of the first step of the fair dealing
inquiry.
b. Fairness Analysis Interpreted in Ways that Have Ensured that
Copyright Owners are not Overcompensated
The SCC has interpreted the fairness analysis in a manner consistent
with the purpose of copyright, as rearticulated beginning in its 2002
decision in Thiberge. In CCH SCC, McLachlin CJC affirmed the correct
approach to be taken with respect to the fairness analysis.8 9 In her reasons
for judgment, McLachlin CJC outlined a list of factors that provide
"a useful analytical framework to govern determinations of fairness in
future cases".9" These factors had originally been articulated by Linden JA
87. SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 22.
88. Supra note 65 at para 27.
89. For clarification, I am endorsing neither the SCC's fairness analysis nor the fair
dealing factors set out by the SCC as mechanisms through which to protect expression
interests. I am merely demonstrating how the SCC has interpreted the fairness factors in
such a manner as to guard against overprotecting copyright owners at the expense of the
public interest, one consequence of which has been to preserve a significant amount of
space in which non-copyright owning parties may exercise their expression interests. In a
future article, I will discuss the fairness factors in depth, arguing that if fair dealing is to be
a mechanism that protects freedom of expression in the context of copyright, then these
factors should be revisited.
90. CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 53.
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in CCH FCA, who arrived at this list after considering Lord Denning's
decision in Hubbardv Vosper (as well as other UK decisions citing Hubbard
v Vosper); the section of the US Copyright Code that sets out the doctrine
of fair use; and David Vaver's discussion of fair dealing in CopyrightLaw.91
These factors are: "(1) the purpose of the dealing; (2) the character of the
dealing; (3) the amount of the dealing; (4) alternatives to the dealing; (5)
the nature of the work; and (6) the effect of the dealing on the work".92
Consistent with the purpose of fair dealing as articulated by McLachlin
CJC in CCHSCC (and with the purpose of copyright more broadly), these
factors have been applied in such a manner as "to ensure that users are
not unduly restricted in their ability to use and disseminate copyrighted
works" .3
The first factor set out by the SCC in CCH SCC is the purpose of the
dealing. One way in which the SCC has applied this factor in a manner
that guards against overcompensating the copyright owner at the expense
of the public interest is by clarifying that commercial dealings can still
satisfy the fairness analysis. This clarification ensures that dealings with
an element of commerciality that would otherwise be considered "fair"
are not deemed unfair due to this element alone-thus ensuring that a
broad range of expressive uses remain protectable under fair dealing.
A second way in which the SCC has applied this factor in a manner
that is protective of the expression interests of non-copyright owning
parties is by noting that commercial dealings "may . . .be fair if there
are 'reasonable safeguards' in place to ensure that the works are actually
being used for research".94 The SCC's determination that the presence of
safeguards is a factor to be considered in determining whether the dealing
was fair pre-empts the argument that could be made by copyright owners
that although the defendant claims that the dealing is being done for a
specific purpose, there is no guarantee that the dealing is being engaged in
for this purpose. In both CCH SCC and SOCAN v Bell, the SCC found
that safeguards were in place that "prevented the previews from replacing
91. CCHFCA, supra note 9 at paras 146-50, citing Hubbardv Vosper (1971), [1972] 2 QB
84 at 94 (CA), Copyright Act of 1976, 17 USC

S 107,

and Vaver, CopyrightLaw, supra note

54.
92. CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 53.
93. Ibid at para 63.
94. SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 36, citing CCHSCC,supra note 9 at paras 54, 66.
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the work while still fulfilling a research function".95 In CCH SCC, the
safeguards took the form of the Access Policy, which "places appropriate
limits on the type of copying that the Law Society will do".96 In SOCAN
v Bell, the safeguards were said to be that "the previews were streamed,
short, and often of lesser quality than the musical work itself".9 The key
question asked by the SCC in this context is whether the safeguard limits
the dealing to the fair dealing purpose argued for by the defendant.9"
In applying the "character of the dealing" factor, Abella J, in SOCAN
v Bell, rejected the argument raised by SOCAN that this factor should
tend to unfairness on the basis that "consumers accessed, on average, 10
times the number of previews as full-length musical works".99 Instead,
Abella J focused on the fact that "[tihe previews were streamed ....
Users did not get a permanent copy, and once the preview was heard,
the file was automatically deleted from the user's computer ... [Meaning
that] . . . copies could not be duplicated or further disseminated by
" 100
users.
In a similar manner, in CCH SCC, McLachlin CJC noted that the
character of the dealing factor supported a finding of fairness in part on the
basis that "[tihere is no evidence that the Law Society was disseminating
multiple copies of works to multiple members of the legal profession."101
In focusing on whether and the extent to which the dealing could act as a
substitute for the work and on the safeguards in place to prevent this from
occurring, rather than on the sheer quantity of content accessed, the SCC
has interpreted this factor in a manner consistent with its rearticulated
purpose of copyright.
The third fairness factor noted by McLachlin CJC is the amount of
the dealing. By assessing the fairness of the dealing based on individual
uses or dealings instead of use in the aggregate, the SCC has interpreted
the amount of the dealing factor in a manner that preserves space for
the expression interests of non-copyright owning parties, again helping to
ensure that copyright owners are not overprotected at the expense of the
95. SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 35.

96. Supra note 9 at para 73.
97. Supra note 10 at para 35.
98. See ibid.
99. Ibid at para 38.

100. Ibid.
101. Supra note 9 at para 67.
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public interest. Both SOCAN in SOCAN v Bell and Access Copyright,
in Alberta (Education),had argued that the "amount of the dealing in the
aggregate" should be considered in evaluating this factor."0 2 Adopting the
approach advocated for by SOCAN and Access Copyright could result
in courts determining that individuals who engaged in minor dealings
with a number of works-for instance, users who listen to a number of
music previews on Apple's iTunes service-would be seen as having acted
"unfairly", even if each individual dealing might be characterized as "fair"
or as tending to "fairness".
Justice Abella rejected this approach. As she noted: "[G]iven the
ease and magnitude with which digital works are disseminated over
the Internet, focusing on the 'aggregate' amount of the dealing in cases
involving digital works could well lead to disproportionate findings of
unfairness when compared with non-digital works"." 3 The SCC's decision
to assess fairness based on individual uses or dealings as opposed to use
in the aggregate has the effect of limiting the extent to which copyright
can impede the dissemination of expression in a digital environment." 4
Cameron Hutchison writes that to evaluate this factor based on aggregate
as opposed to individual use "would have effectively tilted the balance
toward an unfair dealing thus threatening the use of the internet for the
benefit of all concerned"."0 5
The next factor listed by McLachlin CJC addresses "alternatives
to the dealing". By articulating a test in which it is asked if the use is:
"reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate purpose";.0 6 by focusing on
"realistic alternatives";... by suggesting that the existence of an alternative
dealing would tend to unfairness only if it was "equally effective";"'8 and
by rejecting the argument that the availability of a license is relevant to
102. SOCAN v Bell, supra note 10 at para 41. See also Alberta (Education),supra note 65
at para 29.
103. SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 43.
104. As well, examining the amount of the dealing in the aggregate as opposed to assessing
the amount used by the individual defendant could lead to defendants being held liable in
part on the basis of the acts of other users.
105. Cameron J Hutchison, "The 2012 Supreme Court Copyright Decisions &
Technological Neutrality" (2013) 46:2 UBC L Rev 589 at 606.
106. CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 57.
107. Alberta (Education),supra note 65 at para 32.

108. CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 57.

G. Reynolds

the determination of fairness, the SCC has interpreted this factor in ways
that guard against overcompensating copyright owners at the expense of
the public interest (including the public interest in expression).
The SCC could have interpreted the "alternatives to the dealing"
factor in a number of ways. For instance, it could have determined that
so long as any alternatives exist to a dealing, there is no need to make use
of the work and, as a result, the dealing is unfair. Such a test, which would
approximate a strict necessity test in the context of copyright, was rejected
by both Linden JA in CCH FCA and McLachlin CJC in CCH SCC. 19
In its place, Linden JA suggested that one question that could be asked
is "whether the dealing was reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate
purpose".11 Chief Justice McLachlin, in her reasons for judgment, agreed
that this is a useful question for courts to consider. She then suggested that
one instance where a dealing would not be seen as reasonably necessary
would be "if a criticism would be equally effective if it did not actually
m
reproduce the copyrighted work it was criticizing",
This choice of example suggests that "reasonably necessary" will not
be a high bar to reach. It suggests, for instance, that it would be reasonably
necessary to use a copyrighted work in the context of criticism if the
criticism-although effective-would not be equally effective without
reproducing the work. This is not to say that the dealing will be fair.
This determination can only be made after a consideration of all relevant
factors. However, under the approach adopted by the SCC, the dealing
would not support a finding of unfairness on the basis that there were
alternatives, albeit not equally effective, that could have been used.
In applying this factor in SOCAN v Bell, the SCC rejected the
arguments made by SOCAN that other methods, such as advertising
(including "album artwork, textual descriptions, and user-generated
album reviews") and return policies could adequately assist consumers
109. CCH FCA, supra note 9 at para 158; CCH SCC, supra note 9 at para 57. Mark

Bartholomew and John Tehranian argue that US courts have "reduce[d] fair use to a test
about necessity" and in so doing, have "transformed copyright into a more Blackstonian,
absolute form of property". Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, "An Intersystemic
View of Intellectual Property and Free Speech" (2013) 81:1 Geo Wash L Rev 1 at 14
[emphasis in original].
110. CCHFCA, supra note 9 at para 158.
111. CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 57. The words "equally effective" were used neither
in SOCAN v Bell, supra note 10, nor in Alberta (Education),supra note 65.
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in purchasing musical works."'2 With respect to return policies, Abella J
described this as "an expensive, technologically complicated, and marketinhibiting alternative for helping consumers identify the right music" .113
Noting that "none of [these] other suggested alternatives can demonstrate
to a consumer ...what a musical work sounds like", the SCC found
"short, low-quality streamed previews" to be reasonably necessary to the
dealing.1 4 None of these suggested alternatives would be equally effective,
in the view of the SCC.
In Alberta (Education), in applying this factor, the SCC focused on
whether there were "realistic alternative[s]" to the dealing." 5 Access
Copyright had argued that instead of photocopying the textbooks, the
schools could have either bought books for each student or bought books
to place in the library. A similar argument was made by CCH in CCH
FCA."16 Justice Abella, writing for the majority of the Court in Alberta
(Education),rejected this approach. She noted both that "the schools have
already purchased originals that are kept in the class or library", and that
"buying books for each student is not a realistic alternative to teachers
copying short excerpts to supplement student textbooks"."'
A final way in which the SCC has interpreted this factor in a
manner protective of the expression interests of non-copyright owning
parties is by rejecting the argument that the availability of a licence
should be considered in determining whether there is an alternative
to the dealing. This issue was noted, and not explicitly rejected, by
Linden JA in CCH FCA."' Chief Justice McLachlin, on the other hand,
rejected this argument in strong terms, stating: "The availability of a
licence is not relevant to deciding whether a dealing has been fair."119

112. SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 45.
113. Ibld at para 46.
114. Ibid [emphasis in original].
115. Supra note 65 at para 31.
116. Supra note 9 at para 156.
117. Alberta (Education),supra note 65 at para 32.
118. Supra note 9 at para 156. US courts consider the loss of licensing revenue to be a
relevant factor in the context of the fair use analysis. See Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra
note 109 at 21.
119. CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 70.
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She tied her conclusion with respect to this issue to the copyright balance
struck in Thiberge:
If a copyright owner were allowed to license people to use its work and then point to a
person's decision not to obtain a licence as proof that his or her dealings were not fair,
this would extend the scope of the owner's monopoly over the use of his or her work in
a manner that would not be consistent with the CopyrightAct's balance between owner's
rights and user's interests."'

Chief Justice McLachlin thus linked her rejection of this argument
to the need to ensure-consistent with the purpose of copyright, as
articulated by the SCC-that copyright owners are not overprotected at
the expense of the public interest. D'Agostino writes that this analysis
is consistent with "several stakeholder positions within the educational
community that there exists a 'clear-for-fear' culture to obtain often
unnecessary licences out of excessive caution"."'
The SCC's interpretation of the factor that considers the "nature
of the work" has also been interpreted in a manner protective of the
public's interest in expression. In CCH SCC, McLachlin CJC wrote
that "if a work has not been published [and was not confidential], the
dealing may be more fair in that its reproduction with acknowledgment
could lead to a wider public dissemination of the work-one of the
goals of copyright law"."'2 In SOCAN v Bell, this factor is described in
a slightly different manner, as "examin[ing] whether the work is one
which should be widely disseminated".123 This reframing, which focuses
on the value that the public would gain from the dissemination of the
work, is consistent with the way in which this factor was applied in CCH
SCC, in which McLachlin CJC, citing to Linden JA's FCA judgment,
noted that "[1t is generally in the public interest that access to judicial
120. Ibid.

121. D'Agostino, supra note 8 at 322, citing Margaret A Wilkinson, "Filtering the Flow
from the Fountains of Knowledge: Access and Copyright in Education and Libraries"
in Geist, Public Interest, supra note 8, 331. See also Jennifer M Urban & Laura Quilter,
"Efficient Process or Chilling Effects?: Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act" (2006) 22:4 Santa Clara Comp & High Tech Lj 621 (among
others).
122. Supra note 9 at para 58.
123. Supra note 10 at para 47 [emphasis added].
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decisions and other legal resources not be unjustifiably restrained." 12 4
In CCH FCA, Linden JA continued from this statement by noting that
[t]he fact that access to legal publications is in the public interest does not imply that
copying such publications is always fair dealing. On the contrary, these legal works must
be protected to ensure that their authors are not deprived of financial incentives to continue

producing original works."5
It is significant that in her judgment for the Court in CCH SCC,
McLachlin CJC cited the first part of the quote from Linden JA's
judgment noted above, and not the second. Instead, McLachlin CJC
indicated that "the Access Policy puts reasonable limits on the Great
Library's photocopy service", and that "[t]his further supports a finding
126
that the dealings were fair".
Justice Abella, in applying this factor in SOCAN v Bell, drew a
distinction between a work being widely available versus widely
disseminated. She wrote: "[T]he fact that a musical work is widely available
does not necessarily correlate to whether it is widely disseminated. Unless
a potential consumer can locate and identify a work he or she wants to
buy, the work will not be disseminated." 121 Justice Abella's articulation
of this factor suggests that it is possible that this factor could offset other
factors that support a finding of unfairness-for instance the effect of the
dealing on the work-on the basis of the value of the work's dissemination,
that the dissemination of a work that is widely available but not widely
disseminated could be fair.
The SCC has also adopted an approach to the final fair dealing
factor-the "effect of the dealing on the work"-that guards against
overcompensating the copyright owner at the expense of the public
interest. The SCC has done so in three main ways: first, by adopting
an approach to this factor that focuses on economic as opposed to noneconomic factors; second, by adopting a more narrow scope of economic
factors than has been the case in other jurisdictions; and third, by requiring
the party arguing that the dealing is not fair due in part to the effect of the
124.
125.
126.
127.

Supra note 9 at para 71.
Supra note 9 at para 159.
CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 71.
SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 47.
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dealing on the work to demonstrate both negative economic impacts and
a link between the dealing in question and the negative economic impacts.
One way a court could interpret this factor is by focusing on the broad
effects of the dealing on the work. Such an interpretation could encompass
both economic and non-economic consequences. One example of how
this might be applied is found in A TV Music Publishing of CanadaLtd v
Rogers Radio BroadcastingLtd, a case involving a parodic version of the
song "Revolution", authored by John Lennon and Paul McCartney.12
Justice Van Camp granted ATV Music's application for an interlocutory
injunction. In the course of her decision granting the injunction, she
noted that "[l]t would be difficult ever again to listen to the original
song without the words of the new song intruding."'29 This approach,
were it adopted, could result in far fewer findings of fair dealing in cases
where the original work has been transformed, modified or combined
with other existing or new content. For instance, applying this reasoning
broadly could result in this factor supporting findings of unfairness in
situations where dealings cause parties to look at works in different ways,
or in situations where dealings result in impacts to the work's integrity
or to its message.
A similar argument was addressed in the American decision
Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music. 3 ' This case dealt with a parodic version
of the Roy Orbison song "Pretty Woman" created by 2 Live Crew.
As noted by Souter J, who delivered the opinion of the US Supreme
Court: "2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose
fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex,
and a sigh of relief from paternal responsibility". 31 In discussing
whether market harms caused by parodies should impact the fair
use analysis, Souter J, citing to Fisher v Dees, wrote that "the role of
the courts is to distinguish between '[bliting criticism [that merely]
suppresses demand [and] copyright infringement [that] usurps it'". 32

128. (1982), 35 OR (2d) 417, 134 DLR (3d) 487 (H Ct J).
129. Ibid at 422.
130. Supra note 83.
131. Ibid at 583.
132. Ibid at 592, citing to Fisher v Dees, 794 F (2d) 432 at 438 (9th Cir 1986).
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The US Supreme Court considered only the latter as relevant in the
context of the effect of the dealing factor in fair use.133
Like the US Supreme Court in Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, the SCC
has also interpreted this factor as focusing on whether the dealing usurps
demand for the work-or said differently, whether it acts as a substitute for
the work. In SOCANv Bell, for instance, Abella J, in applying this factor,
wrote that "[b]ecause of their short duration and degraded quality, it can
hardly be said that previews are in competition with downloads of the
34 As well, Abella J noted that "since the effect of previews is
work itself"'.1
to increase the sale and therefore the dissemination of copyrighted musical
works thereby generating remuneration to their creators, it cannot be
said that they have a negative impact on the work"'.135 To echo Binnie J's
judgment in Thiberge, interpreting this factor (and the fairness analysis
more broadly) in such a manner as to find that the previews in question
in SOCAN v Bell are unfair would be to unduly burden the public's
interest in expression and thus to overcompensate copyright owners at
the expense of the public interest.
The SCC, in applying this factor, has required-both in CCHSCC and
in several decisions post-CCH SCC-the party arguing that the dealing
was not fair to bring evidence demonstrating both negative economic
impacts, and a link between the dealing in question and any negative
economic impacts. For instance, in Alberta (Education),Abella J (writing
for the majority) noted:
In CCH, the Court concluded that since no evidence had been tendered by the publishers
of legal works to show that the market for the works had decreased as a result of the copies
made by the Great Library, the detrimental impact had not been demonstrated. Similarly,
other than the bald fact of a decline in sales over 20 years, there is no evidence from Access
Copyright demonstrating any link between photocopying short excerpts and the decline
3
in textbook sales. 1
133. More generally, however, Bartholomew and Tehranian argue that US courts have
both defined market harm broadly (including "encompass[ing] theoretical markets that a
copyright holder is unlikely to enter") and given it a prominent role to play in the fair use
analysis, making it less likely that a defendant will be able to make out a fair use defence
and resulting in "less deference being given to free speech interests than other intellectual
property regimes". Bartholomew & Tehranian, supra note 109 at 24.
134. Supra note 10 at para 48.
135. Ibid [emphasis in original].
136. Supra note 65 at para 35 [emphasis in original].
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In making this point, Abella J also noted that "there were several other
factors that were likely to have contributed to the decline in sales, such as
the adoption of semester teaching, a decrease in registrations, the longer
lifespan of textbooks, increased use of the Internet and other electronic
tools, and more resource-based learning"Y
D'Agostino frames the SCC's interpretation of this factor in CCH
SCC as an onus shift.13 Another way to describe the SCC's interpretation
of this factor is as a shift of the strategic burden.139 Chief Justice McLachlin
in CCH SCC acknowledged that
[a]lthough the burden of proving fair dealing lies with the Law Society, it lacked access
to evidence about the effect of the dealing on the publishers' markets. If there had been
evidence that the publishers' markets had been negatively affected by the Law Society's
custom photocopying service, it would have been in the publishers' interest to tender it at
trial. They did not do so."'

In situations in which the plaintiffs may be best positioned to offer

information relating to the economic impact of the dealing on the work,
requiring the defendant to bring evidence that the dealing has had no
economic impact would impose a significant burden on them.141 Such a
requirement would narrow the ambit of the defence significantly.
Even if the plaintiff is able to establish negative economic impactssuch as a drop in sales, for instance-the SCC's fairness jurisprudence
suggests that unless this evidence can be linked to or attributed to the
dealing itself, this factor will not support a finding of unfairness. The
SCC's interpretation of this factor is thus consistent with the purpose of
copyright, as articulated by the SCC, under which rewards are granted to
copyright owners in order to incentivize the creation of expression, and

137. Ibid at para 33.
138. D'Agostino, supra note 8 at 325.
139. As described by La Forest J in his dissenting reasons in R v Noble, [1997] 1 SCR 874,
146 DLR (4th) 385 [cited to SCR]. "If a case against the accused has been adduced that is
capable of supporting an inference of guilt, it may be a wise strategy for the accused to
testify in order to refute the case to meet; this does not involve a shift in the legal burden
of proof to the accused, but rather involves a shift of a strategic burden." Jbid at para 92.
140. Supra note 9 at para 72.
141. D'Agostino writes that "publishers are often the more sophisticated parties in a
better position to access such records". D'Agostino, supra note 8 at 324.
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under which uses of copyrighted expression that do not impact upon this
purpose should not be enjoined.

III. Accounting for the Absence of Explicit
Discussion of Freedom of Expression in the
Context of the SCC's Copyright Jurisprudence
In the previous Part, I described the way in which the SCC has
interpreted the fair dealing provisions of the Copyright Act in such a
manner as to preserve significant space for the expression interests of
non-copyright owners. In this section, I will explore the question of why,
if the SCC's post-2002 copyright jurisprudence has resulted in expanded
protection for the expression interests of non-copyright owning parties,
the SCC has not yet explicitly engaged with the relationship between the
Charterright to freedom of expression and copyright.
A. GuardingAgainst the Overcompensationof Copyright Owners
First, the absence of explicit discussion of the Charterright to freedom
of expression in the context of the SCC's copyright jurisprudence can
be explained in part on the basis that a primary focus of the SCC's post2002 copyright jurisprudence has been to ensure that the rewards granted
to copyright owners in order to incentivize the creation of expression
do not overcompensate copyright owners at the expense of the public
interest (an important aspect of which is the public interest in accessing,
disseminating and using expression).
Consistent with this focus, user rights (generally) and fair dealing
(specifically) have been portrayed as mechanisms limiting the exclusive
rights of copyright owners, as opposed to stand-alone defences through
which freedom of expression is protected and promoted. As interpreted by
the SCC, fair dealing is a mechanism that guards against overcompensating
copyright owners in that it helps ensure that copyright users are not
"unduly restricted" in their ability to use copyrighted works."' Fair
dealing, according to the SCC, is a tool that mediates between "protection
and access".143
142. CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 63.
143. SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 11.
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Interpreted in this way, fair dealing reflects and is embedded within
an instrumentalist approach to copyright. In that sense, it is perhaps not
surprising that although one result of the SCC's interpretation of the fair
dealing provisions of the Copyright Act, as detailed above, has been to
preserve a significant degree of space within which non-copyright owning
parties may express themselves using copyrighted works, the SCC has
not explicitly linked fair dealing to freedom of expression-a right that
transcends instrumentalist approaches to copyright and that embodies a
broader range of values (including self-fulfillment, democratic discourse
and truth-finding).144
B. Charter Values May Only be Used to Interpret Statutory Provisions in
Limited Circumstances
Second, the absence of explicit SCC discussion of freedom of expression
in the context of the SCC's post-2002 copyright jurisprudence can be
explained, in part, by the SCC's conclusion in Bell ExpressVu Limited
Partnershipv R that courts should only use Chartervalues as tools through
which to interpret statutory provisions in limited circumstances.145 While
it is a legitimate exercise of judicial authority for Canadian courts to shape
or reshape the common law according to Charter values,146 Canadian

courts are more limited in their ability to interpret statutory provisionslike those of the CopyrightAct-in light of Chartervalues.
As Iacobucci J stated in Bell Express Vu:
[W]hen a statute comes into play during judicial proceedings, the courts (absent any
challenge on constitutional grounds) are charged with interpreting and applying it in
accordance with the sovereign intent of the legislator. In this regard, although it is sometimes
suggested that "it is appropriate for courts to prefer interpretations that tend to promote
those [Charter]principles and values over interpretations that do not", it must be stressed
that, to the extent this Court has recognized a "Charter values" interpretive principle, such

144. See e.g. Montr&l (City), supra note 2 at para 74.
145. Bell Express Vu, supra note 11 at paras 28 -30.
146. See ibid at para 61.
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principle can only receive application in circumstances of genuine ambiguity, i.e., where a
statutory provision is subject to differing, but equally plausible, interpretations."'

The SCC has further stated that to interpret all statutory provisions in
light of Chartervalues would
wrongly upset the dialogic balance. Every time the principle were applied, it would
pre-empt judicial review on Charter grounds, where resort to the internal checks and
balances of s. 1 may be had. In this fashion, the legislatures would be largely shorn of their
constitutional power to enact reasonable limits on Charter rights and freedoms, which
would in turn be inflated to near absolute status.1"

In at least one judgment, the SCC had the opportunity to reference
Chartervalues in the context of its decision. In CCH FCA, which was
heard by the FCA prior to Bell ExpressVu being heard by the SCC and
was handed down approximately three weeks after Bell ExpressVu was
handed down, Linden JA noted that
the Law Society's factum strongly encouraged this Court to take account of Constitutional
and Charter values, such as the rule of law, equality, and access to justice, to defend its
photocopying service ....
Moreover, broadly speaking, I have implicitly considered the
values advocated by the Law Society in balancing of the Publishers' rights with the public
interest. To me, the Publishers' rights must also be fairly recognized in order to guarantee
incentives to continue to provide original legal publications."'

In her reasons for judgment in CCH FCA, McLachlin CJC,although
she cited Bell Express Vu, did not make any reference to Chartervalues (or
to "values" at all). Rather, McLachlin CJC cited Bell ExpressIu for the
proposition that "[iun interpreting the scope of the Copyright Act's rights
and remedies, courts should apply the modern approach to statutory
147. Ibid at para 62 [citation omitted, emphasis in original]. This approach to statutory
interpretation can be contrasted with that adopted by L'Heureux-Dub6 J in her dissenting
reasons in Symes v Canada, [1993] 4 SCR 695, 110 DLR (4th) 470 [cited to SCR] (in
which she noted that "the respect of Chartervalues must be at the forefront of statutory
interpretation" at 794).
148. Bell Express Vu, supra note 11 at para 66.
149. Supra note 9 at paras 170-71 [citation omitted]. CCH FCA was heard on October
23-25, 2001, and the decision was handed down May 14, 2002. Bell Express Vu, on the other
hand, was heard on December 4, 2001 with the decision being handed down on April 26,
2002.
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interpretation" under which the purpose or objective of copyright
assumes a central role.150
Some commentators and foreign courts have adopted an approach to
the intersection of freedom of expression and copyright through which
tension between freedom of expression and copyright is resolved not by
relying on external constitutional analyses, but by interpreting copyright's
internal mechanisms-including fair dealing or its equivalent-according
to freedom of expression values.151 As detailed above, however, this
option is not broadly available to Canadian courts due to the conclusion
reached in Bell ExpressVu that it is only appropriate to interpret statutory
provisions in accordance with Chartervalues in limited circumstances.

150. CCHSCC, supra note 9 at para 9.
151. See e.g. Ashdown, supra note 6; Patrick Masiyakurima, "The Free Speech
Benefits of Fair Dealing Defences" in Paul Torremans, ed, Intellectual Property and
Human Rights: Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights (Frederick, Alphen
aan de Rijn: Kluwer Law, 2008) 235. Some scholars, however, have argued that
internal mechanisms alone are not sufficient to address constitutional or human rights
concerns. See e.g. Eric Barendt, "Copyright and Free Speech Theory" in Jonathan
Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen, eds, Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative and
InternationalAnalyses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 11. Barendt argues that
[i]t
is wrong for the courts to hold that the copyright statute necessarilysafeguards
freedom of speech, so no further consideration of the relationship of expression
and copyright is required. That would be an abdication of their responsibility to
determine the scope of constitutional rights, in this context the right to freedom
of expression, and how far it is necessary to restrict its exercise to protect the right
to copyright.
Ibid at 15 [emphasis in original]. See also Laurence R Helfer & Graeme W Austin, Human
Rights and Intellectual Property (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 508;
Michael Birnhack, "Acknowledging the Conflict Between Copyright Law and Freedom
of Expression under the Human Rights Act" [2003] Ent L Rev 24; Christophe Geiger &
Elena Izyumenko, "Copyright on the Human Rights' Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of
Exclusivity Through Freedom of Expression" (2014) 45:3 Intl Rev Intellectual Property &
Competition L 316; Rebecca Tushnet, "Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What
Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform,
and Telecommunications Regulation" (2000) 42:1 Boston College L Rev 1.
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C. The Copyright Act Fully or Adequately Protects Freedom of Expression
Interests
A third explanation for the absence of explicit SCC engagement with
the Charterright to freedom of expression is that, in a manner consistent
with lower Canadian courts, the SCC has accepted that once the
provisions of the Copyright Act are properly and purposively interpreted,
the Copyright Act adequately protects the Charter right to freedom of
expression, and that it is therefore not necessary to provide additional
protection for freedom of expression interests by explicitly engaging with
the Charterright to freedom of expression.
Ysolde Gendreau, for instance, suggests that the lack of engagement by
Canadian courts (including the SCC) with the Charterright to freedom
of expression "could ... be explained by the hypothesis that copyright
law already incorporates freedom of expression values through its own
mechanisms".152 Carys Craig, as well, refers to the "largely unchallenged
assumption ... that the copyright system sufficiently respects freedomof-expression values by virtue of internal mechanisms" as a "contributing
factor" in the "paucity of constitutional scrutiny of the Copyright Act".153
Consistent with this argument, it could also be argued that the process
of statutory interpretation engaged in by the SCC through the course
of its post-2002 copyright jurisprudence, one result of which has been
to clarify that the Copyright Act grants a significant degree of latitude to
non-copyright owning parties to express themselves using copyrighted
works, has weakened the argument that courts should give additional
consideration to the constitutional validity of provisions of the Copyright
Act. If statutory interpretation has resulted in adequate protection of
freedom of expression interests, then why should further steps be taken
to consider the constitutionality of copyright?

152. Ysolde Gendreau, "Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Canada" in Paul
Torremans, ed, Copyright and Human Rights: Freedom of Expression, IntellectualProperty,

Privacy (New York: Kluwer Law International, 2004) 21 at 22.
153. Craig, "Dissolving Conflict", supra note 5 at 78.
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IV. Challenging the Absence of Explicit
Discussion of Freedom of Expression in the
Context of the SCC's Copyright Jurisprudence
Canadian courts, including the SCC, are "guardians of the Constitution
and of individuals' rights under it"'.154 In order to uphold this role, the SCC
may be required to explicitly engage with the Charterright to freedom
of expression in the context of copyright. This is not to say, however,
that the SCC must abandon its purposive approach to provisions of the
Copyright Act. Rather, both approaches can be applied in concert. The
SCC can continue to interpret statutory provisions purposively, according
to the modern approach, while also taking steps-where appropriate-to
explicitly engage with the Charterright to freedom of expression in the
context of copyright.
Explicitly considering the Charter right to freedom of expression
could supplement the SCC's existing purposive interpretations of
provisions of the Copyright Act in a number of ways. First, the SCC
could re-conceptualize fair dealing (or other user rights) not as a limit
on copyright owners' rights, but as a stand-alone defence the purpose
of which is to promote or protect freedom of expression. Second,
in limited circumstances, the SCC could interpret provisions of the
Copyright Act in light of Charter values.155 Third, the SCC could
explicitly weigh provisions of the Copyright Act against the Charterright
to freedom of expression. While it is beyond the scope of this article
to address these proposals in detail, I mention them as possible options
through which Canadian courts might begin to explicitly engage with
the Charterright to freedom of expression in the context of copyright.

154. Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 169, 11 DLR (4th) 641.

155. See Fewer, supra note 5 (published prior to BellExpressVu being handed down, Fewer
"proposes a . ..purposive approach to copyright defences .. .explicitly balancing the

plaintiff's proprietary interests with the defendant's Charterconsiderations" at 184).
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A. FairDealingas a Freedom of ExpressionDefence

As noted above, one way in which the SCC could explicitly engage
with the Charter right to freedom of expression in the context of
copyright is by exploring the extent to which fair dealing (or user rights
more generally) could be reconceptualized as a stand-alone defence-the
purpose of which is to promote or protect freedom of expression. Courts
in several jurisdictions, including the US and the UK, have referred to
fair dealing in such a manner.156 As well, despite the SCC not having done
so, a number of scholars have linked the SCC's fair dealing jurisprudence
to freedom of expression or to human rights more broadly.1"
Furthermore, the SCC's fair dealing jurisprudence already has a
connection to Canadian constitutional law embedded within it. In CCH
SCC, McLachlin CJC described the interpretation to be given to fair
dealing categories as "large and liberal"'.15 Canadian courts have also
employed this phrase in discussing how provisions of the Constitution
Act, 1867,159 the Constitution Act, 1982160 and the Charter ought to be
interpreted. 161For instance, in Edwards v Canada (A G), Lord Sankey LC
noted that "[t]he British North America Act planted in Canada a living
tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits", and that it
162
is the duty of courts to give this Act "a large and liberal interpretation".
Given this connection, it is perhaps not out of the question that the SCC
might one day reconceptualize fair dealing as a defence, the purpose of
which is to promote or protect freedom of expression.
156. See Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003) at 219-20; Golan v Holder, supra note 6 at
890; SASInstituteIncv WorldProgrammingLtd,[2010] EWHC 1829 (Ch) at para 325.

157. See e.g. Vaver, "Copyright Defences", supra note 57 at 669-72; Marcelo Thompson,
"Property Enforcement or Retrogressive Measure?: Copyright Reform in Canada and the
Human Right of Access to Knowledge" (2007) 4 U Ottawa L & Technology J 163; Richard
Peltz, "Global Warming Trend?: The Creeping Indulgence of Fair Use in International
Copyright Law" (2009) 17:2 Tex Intell Prop Lj 267 at 281.
158. Supra note 9 at para 51.
159. (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5.
160. Supra note 1.
161. See Reference re Saime-Sex Marriage,2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 SCR 698; Application under
s 83.28 of the CriminalCode (Re), 2004 SCC 42, [2004] 2 SCR 248; Doucet-Boudreau v Nova
Scotia (Ministerof Education),2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 SCR 3; R v 974649 OntarioInc, 2001
SCC 81, [2001] 3 SCR 575.
162. [1929] UKPC 86 at 136.
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B. Application of Charter Values in Limited Circumstances
In Bell ExpressVu, the SCC concluded that statutory provisions may
only be interpreted in light of Charter values in limited circumstances.
However, the fact that Canadian courts are limited in the extent to which
they may interpret statutory provisions inlight of Chartervalues does not
mean that Canadian courts may not interpret any statutory provisions
in light of Chartervalues. Drawing from Iacobucci J's judgment in Bell
ExpressVu, the question that courts must ask, in each instance in which
it is argued that statutory provisions should be interpreted according to
Chartervalues, is whether the circumstances in question constitute those
163
of "genuine ambiguity
Describing "[w]hat . . .in law is an ambiguity", Iacobucci J, in
Bell ExpressVu, cited Major J's judgment in CanadianOxy Chemicals
Ltd v Canada (A G), in which he noted that: "It is only when genuine
ambiguity arises between two or more plausible readings, each equally
in accordance with the intentions of the statute, that the courts need to
resort to external interpretive aids". 164 Thus, in order to determine
whether circumstances of genuine ambiguity exist, courts must first
determine the intention of the statute and second, must apply the
modern approach to statutory interpretation. It is only when the
application of this approach results in "differing, but equally plausible,
interpretations" that Charter values may be used as an interpretive
mechanism. 165 Justice Abella has suggested that "where more than one
interpretation of a provision is equally plausible, Chartervalues should be
66
used to determine which interpretation is constitutionally compliant.1
In the event that a court determines that it is appropriate to apply
Chartervalues as an interpretive tool with respect to certain provisions of
the Copyright Act, what substantive impact might this have on Canadian
copyright law? In this article, I have described the impact of interpreting
fair dealing through the lens of the purpose of copyright as rearticulated
by the SCC. Interpreting fair dealing in accordance with the Charterright
to freedom of expression (should it be determined that it is appropriate
163. Supra note 11 at para 62.
164. Ibid at para 29, citing CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd v Canada (Attorney General),

[1999] 1 SCR 743 at 750, 171 DLR (4th) 733 [emphasis inBellExpressVu].
165. Bell Express Vu, supra note 11 at para 62.

166. R v Clarke, 2014 SCC 28 at para 15, [2014] 1 SCR 612 [emphasis added].
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to apply Chartervalues as an interpretive tool with respect to fair dealing)
could lead to different outcomes-for instance, a different set of fairness
factors articulated by courts. While a fulsome discussion of this issue is
beyond the scope of this article, one factor that could be considered by
courts applying Chartervalues as an interpretive tool with respect to fair
dealing is whether, and the extent to which, the dealing advances the
values underlying the Charter right to freedom of expression, "namely
self-fulfilment, democratic discourse and truth finding". 16 7
A second area in which explicitly referencing Chartervalues could
substantively impact Canadian copyright law is in the administrative law
context. Both the manner in which an administrative body exercises its
statutory discretion and the standard of review applied to the decisions
of administrative bodies differ when an administrative decision maker
applies Chartervalues in the exercise of its statutory discretion versus
when an administrative decision maker renders a decision in which it
does not apply Chartervalues.
The leading SCC decision to address the correct approach to be taken in
judicial review of decisions of administrative tribunals where Chartervalues
are not at stake is Dunsmuirv New Brunswick.168 As noted by Bastarache
and LeBel JJ, who delivered the reasons for judgment for the majority,
"[w]here the question is one of fact, discretion or policy, deference will
usually apply automatically";169 the question is one of reasonableness.1"
Justices Bastarache and LeBel stated that when conducting judicial review,
courts should look to whether there is "the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process as
well as to "whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law".171
The SCC first addressed the related questions of the impact of the
application of Charter values on the decision-making processes of
administrative tribunals and the standard of review of those decisions in

167. Canadian Broadcasting Corp v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 2 at para 37,

[2011] 1 SCR 19.
168. 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir].
169. Ibid at para 53.
170. Ibid at para 46.
171. Ibid at para 47.

G. Reynolds

the 2012 decision of Doriv Barreau du Quibec.1 72 In this decision, Abella J
(who delivered the reasons for judgment for the Court) wrote that
[ain administrative decision-maker appl[ies] Charter values in the exercise of statutory
discretion .... [by] balanc[ing] the Chartervalues with the statutory objectives. In effecting
this balancing, the decision-maker should first consider the statutory objectives .... Then
the decision-maker should ask how the Chartervalue at issue will best be protected in view
of the statutory objectives."3

Similarly, the process of judicial review differs from the approach
outlined above in Dunsmuirwhen the decision maker has applied Charter
values. As noted by Abella J in Dor:
On judicial review, the question becomes whether, in assessing the impact of the relevant
Charter protection and given the nature of the decision and the statutory and factual
contexts, the decision reflects a proportionate balancing of the Charter protections at
play .... If, in exercising its statutory discretion, the decision-maker has properly balanced
the relevant Charter value with the statutory objectives, the decision will be found to be
reasonable."

The Copyright Board is the primary administrative tribunal in the
context of copyright. The standard of review that should be applied to
decisions of the Copyright Board was most recently addressed in Rogers
v SOCAN.1 In this decision, Rothstein J, writing for the majority,
affirmed that "correctness should be the appropriate standard of review on
questions of law arising on judicial review from the Copyright Board".1 76
Justice Rothstein also held that "the Board's application of the correct
legal principles to the facts of a particular matter should be treated with
deference".1

If it is accepted that copyright engages Chartervalues such as freedom
of expression, however, the question on judicial review would not
simply be whether there is "existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process" or "whether the
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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defensible in respect of the facts and law".178 Instead, the reviewing court
would need to ask whether the Copyright Board has "properly balanced
the relevant Charter value", such as freedom of expression, with the
objectives of the Copyright Act.1" It is possible that asking this question
could lead to different outcomes than under the current approach.
Thus, although courts are constrained in their ability to apply Charter
values in the context of copyright due to Bell ExpressVu, they are not
precluded from applying Charter values in all contexts. As discussed
above, it is possible that the application of such an approach might
have a substantive impact upon Canadian copyright jurisprudence.
Such a possibility should not be discounted by Canadian courts asked
to reconsider the relationship between the Charterright to freedom of
expression and copyright.
C. Explicit Challenges to the Constitutionalityof Copyright

The third explanation given above to account, at least in part, for the
absence of explicit SCC engagement with the Charterright to freedom
of expression in the context of copyright is that the SCC may have
accepted that properly interpreted, the Copyright Act fully or adequately
accommodates expression interests, and it is therefore unnecessary to
explicitly engage with the Charterright to freedom of expression in the
context of copyright. This explanation assumes that the Charter right
to freedom of expression can be adequately protected through statutory
interpretation alone. For several reasons, I argue that this assumption is
flawed.
First, the ability of Canadian courts to protect expression interests
through statutory interpretation is limited, whether informed by Charter
values or not. Under the modern approach to statutory interpretation, for
instance, courts' interpretations of statutory provisions are constrained by
both the structure and wording of the legislation, as well as by the purpose
178. Dunsmuir,supra note 168 at para 47.
179. Dori,supra note 172 at para 58. See Graham Reynolds, "Of Reasonableness, Fairness
and the Public Interest: Judicial Review of Copyright Board Decisions in Canada's
Copyright" in Geist, CopyrightPentalogy,supra note 8 at 159. In this article I argue that the
Copyright Board, in its decision in Alberta (Education),interpreted fair dealing through the
lens of an author-centric approach to copyright.
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of the legislation."'O As Rothstein J noted in the majority judgment in
SONDRA C: "purposive construction is a tool of statutory interpretation
to assist in understanding the meaning of the text. It is not a standalone basis for the Court to develop its own theory of what it considers
appropriate policy"." 1 Amendments to the Copyright Act might modify
the range of interpretive possibilities open to courts, which could in turn
impact the degree of protection for expression interests."8 2 Furthermore,
as described above, the ability of Canadian courts to interpret provisions
of the Copyright Act according to Chartervalues is also limited due to the
SCC's decision in Bell Express Vu.183

Second, in light of the SCC's conclusion that courts may interpret
provisions according to Charter values only in limited circumstances,
relying exclusively on statutory interpretation as the sole mechanism
through which to protect expression interests inappropriately insulates
provisions of the Copyright Act from Charter scrutiny. The reason cited
by the SCC for limiting the extent to which statutory provisions can
be interpreted according to Charter values is that broad application of
such a principle would, as noted by Charron J, "deprive the Charterof its
more powerful purpose-the determination of the constitutional validity
of the legislation".84 According to Iacobucci J, "interpret[ing] all statutes
such that they conformed to the Charter" would strip legislatures "of
their constitutional power to enact reasonable limits on Charter rights
and freedoms, which would in turn be inflated to near absolute status".*5
The corollary of this statement is that litigants must be able to challenge
statutory provisions as unreasonable limits on their Charter rights.
Yet under the leading Canadian case to have addressed the intersection
of freedom of expression and copyright, these challenges will fail.
180. For the prevailing approach to statutory interpretation in Canada (the modern
approach to statutory interpretation), see Driedger, supra note 42 ("the words of an act are
to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously
within the scheme of the Act, the object of the act, and the intention of Parliament" at 87).
181. Supra note 46 at para 55.
182. For instance, the federal government could amend the Copyright Act to include a
provision articulating a purpose of copyright. It could also substantively amend certain
provisions of the CopyrightAct, add additional provisions or remove provisions currently
part of the CopyrightAct.
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In Michelin, Teitelbaum J concluded that "[t]he Charter does not confer the
right to use private property-the Plaintiff's copyright-in the service of
freedom of expression",8 6 If it is neither possible to "interpret ... statutes
such that they conform to the Charter"nor to challenge the constitutional
validity of statutory provisions, then the provisions limiting Charter
rights-in this case the provisions of Canada's Copyright Act-might
themselves be "inflated to near absolute status"18
The SCC has yet to opine upon the approaches to the intersection
of the Charterright to freedom of expression and copyright adopted by
lower Canadian courts or to comment on whether the decisions from
which these approaches are drawn are still good law. It has, however,
cited Michelin for a different point of law, demonstrating that it is aware
of this decision.88 The SCC's silence with respect to the intersection of
the Charterright to freedom of expression and copyright could be due to
a lack of opportunity to address these questions. However, among other
reasons, it could also be attributed to the SCC's acceptance of the idea
that statutory interpretation, in the context of copyright, adequately or
fully protects the Charterright to freedom of expression. To the extent
that this idea underlies the SCC's approach to the intersection of the
Charter right to freedom of expression and copyright, I argue that it
merits reconsideration.

Conclusion
In this article, relying on the fair dealing provisions of the Copyright
Act as my case study, I have argued that one result of the SCC's post2002 copyright jurisprudence has been to clarify that the CopyrightAct
grants a significant degree of latitude to non-copyright owning parties
to express themselves using copyrighted works. This result has been
achieved without the SCC having explicitly engaged with the Charter
right to freedom of expression and copyright. Rather, it has been achieved
through the process of statutory interpretation.
I have provided several explanations for the absence of explicit
discussion of the Charterright to freedom of expression in the context
186. Supra note 5 at para 85.
187. Bell Express Vu, supra note 11 at para 66.

188. See Thiberge, supra note 12 at paras 46, 73.
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of the SCC's copyright decisions. First, I argued that the SCC has
conceptualized fair dealing and other user rights as mechanisms that limit
copyright owners' rights, as opposed to defences the purpose of which
is to protect or promote freedom of expression."8 9 Conceptualized in
this manner, it has not been strictly necessary for the SCC to engage
with the intersection of the Charter right to freedom of expression
and copyright. Second, I argued that the ability of courts to interpret
provisions of the Copyright Act in light of Chartervalues is limited by the
SCC's determination in Bell ExpressVu that statutory provisions should
only be interpreted in accordance with Chartervalues in circumstances
of "genuine ambiguity".190 Third, I suggested that the absence of explicit
discussion of freedom of expression in the context of the SCC's post-2002
copyright jurisprudence could be interpreted as the SCC having accepted
that, interpreted correctly (through the lens of the purpose of copyright,
as rearticulated by the SCC), the CopyrightAct either fully or adequately
protects the Charterright to freedom of expression.
However, there are limits to the use of statutory interpretation as
a mechanism through which to protect expression interests. Relying
exclusively on statutory interpretation as the mechanism through which
to protect the Charterright to freedom of expression in the context of
copyright-particularly in light of the SCC's determination that statutory
provisions may be interpreted according to Charterrights only in limited
circumstances-fails to adequately protect this right. To the extent to
which the SCC's approach to the intersection of the Charter right to
freedom of expression and copyright is based on the assumption that
the Charterright to freedom of expression can be adequately protected,
in the context of copyright, through statutory interpretation alone, this
approach must be reconsidered.

189. See SOCANv Bell, supra note 10 at para 11.
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